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Cue integrationThe feeling of being the source and controller of one's actions and their effects in the outside world is an
important aspect of our sense of self. Disturbances in this sense of agency (SoA) were observed in schizophrenia
and have been linked to impairments in sensorimotor integration.
We used a virtual-world action-monitoring paradigm to investigate the SoA in 20 schizophrenic patients and 18
healthy subjects. Participants continuouslymoved a virtual pen displayed on a computer screen using a touchpad
device. The control they exceededover the virtual penwas switched periodically between the participant and the
computer. Participants were requested to monitor their actions and the effects on the virtual pen, and indicate
loss or regain of control over the pen's movement by button presses.
The numbers of erroneous external attribution of action effects (false negative agency judgements) and
erroneous self-attribution (false positive agency judgements) were not signiﬁcantly different in patients and
healthy subjects. However, patients showed a signiﬁcant increase in the duration of false negative agency
judgements. Moreover, the number of false negative agency judgements as well as the number and the duration
of false positive agency judgements were negatively correlated with the performance in cognitive tests (BACS)
in the patient group only.
Our ﬁndings indicate that the evaluation system to detect a mismatch between actions and their effects in the
outside world is probably more rigid in schizophrenic patients, which leads to an increased self-attribution
bias for action effects, as commonly found in delusions of control. The impairment in sensorimotor integration
may be compensated for by stronger cognitive control.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
In our daily life we constantly perform goal-directed actions, and
even though we usually do not reﬂect upon them, we normally
experience them as self-initiated. This feeling of being the agent of our
own actions and knowing “that I am the one who is causing an action”
has been described as “the sense of agency” (SoA), Gallagher, 2000).
Recent computational theories provide a theoretical account for
the underlying mechanisms that may constitute the SoA. Models of
sensorimotor prediction (Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000; Bays and
Wolpert, 2007) suggest that internal signals generated by voluntary
movement (re-afferences; von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950) are
processed differently from signals of external origin and sensory input
is cancelled or attenuated based on motor command signals (Voss et al.,
2006, 2008). In brief, a forwardmodel predicts the sensory consequenceschiatry and Psychotherapy,
Grosse Hamburger Str. 5-11,
. This is an open access article underof current motor output, and compares this prediction with actual
sensory input. Importantly, conscious perception reﬂects only the error
generated by this comparison, since there is no need to perceive what
can already be predicted (Blakemore et al., 1998). It has been suggested
that prediction based on efference copy may be compromised in
schizophrenia (e.g. Frith and Done, 1989; Lindner et al., 2005).
Accordingly, positive symptoms such as delusions of control may occur
because the comparator lacks a predictive input (Blakemore et al.,
2002). The comparator model therefore predicts a reduced sense of
agency in schizophrenia — as found in delusions of control. Surprisingly,
this is at odds with a number of ﬁndings. For example, several studies
asked patients to identify explicitly whether a visual signal corresponded
to an action they had just made or not (Daprati et al., 1997; Franck et al.,
2001; Fourneret et al., 2002; Farrer et al., 2004; Knoblich et al., 2004). All
studies show that in such situations, where visual feedback of an action is
distorted, patients are more likely than controls to identify an action as
their own. Patients tend to perceive actions as their own, or originating
internally, rather than externally as comparator theories would predict.
Comparator models can therefore not entirely explain excessive agency
in schizophrenia.the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Table 1
Sample characteristics. Signiﬁcant differences are highlighted with gray.
Sz HC
Mean (SD) n Mean (SD) n p
Age (years) 37.1(7.8) 20 36.7(8.9) 18 .86a
Sex (male / female) 15/5 20 13/ 5 18 .85b
BACS (sum score) 256.8(40.8) 18 285.3(23.3) 18 .01a
SAPS (sum score) 24.5(12.9) 18
SANS (sum score) 19.3(12.4) 18
Chlorpromazine equivalents 321.6(334.9) 20
Abbreviations: SAPS - Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms; SANS - Scale for
the Assessment of Negative Symptoms; BACS – Brief Assessment of Cognition in
Schizophrenia.
a 2-sample t-test.
b χ2-Test.
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suggested a two-factor account of agency, in which a low-level “feeling”
of agency is contrasted with a higher level “judgement” of agency.
The feeling of agency (FoA) is conceptualised as a fundamental
sense of being an agent of an action and depends mainly on the
coherence of motor and sensory cues and its temporal relationship.
While the FoA remains implicit, the so-called judgment of agency
(JoA) comprises a more cognitive, higher order agency attribution.
Based on the integration of complex cognitive cues such as contextual
and social cues, prior expectations or core beliefs, an explicit conceptual,
interpretative judgement of being the agent of an action is made
(Synofzik et al., 2008). The inﬂuence of additional cues on the JoA-level
may explain the above-mentioned contradiction; the self-attribution
bias commonly observed in schizophrenia patients could then be seen
as a strong cognitive inﬂuence, possibly to compensate for increased
uncertainty.
Cue-integration approaches (Synofzik et al., 2009; Synofzik and Voss,
2010; Moore and Fletcher, 2011) may give a clearer understanding of
how sensorimotor, perceptual and environmental cues complement, or
compete with, each other to form a SoA. Moore and Feltcher (2011)
suggested a Bayesian integrative framework, including not only actual,
transient internal and external cues, but also more stable priors about
the most probable outcome of an action. Synofzik et al. (2013) pointed
out the interplay between predictive and retrospective information
within this cue integration process, while keeping the distinction
between FoA and JoA in mind.
In the present study,we created an experiment, inwhich participants
continuously had to report their subjective agency experience while
controlling a virtual pen, similar to controlling a cursor on a screen
via a computer mouse. Since visual feedback was de-coupled from
participant's hand movements in unpredictable intervals, we created a
situation of constant ambiguity with respect to the basic feeling of
agency (FoA). However, since the FoA is a low-level, implicit experience,
and therefore a direct measure of the FoA is not possible, we forced
our participants continuously into an explicit judgement about their
agency experience. Importantly, we were able to examine two different
situations that occurred during the course of the experiment: in one
situation, participants felt that they were in control of the virtual pen,
although in fact the pen's movements on the screen were independent
of the participant's hand movements (false positive agency judgement).
In the other situation, participants were in fact controlling the virtual
pen with their hand movements but were not aware of it (false negative
agency judgement). The total number and the duration of such false
positive of false negative judgements could be compared between the
groups (patients suffering from schizophrenia and healthy subjects)
and correlations with psychopathology measures and measures of
cognitive performance could be computed. We were therefore able to
investigate the potential inﬂuence of factors such as psychopathology
or cognitive performance on judgements of agency (JoA) in health and
disease.
2. Methods
2.1. Subjects
Twenty patients with schizophrenia (paranoid subtype; Sz) and a
group of 18 age-, gender- and education-matched healthy subjects
were included in the study. Paranoid schizophrenia and other Axis-I
psychiatric disorders were diagnosed according to the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text rev.; DSM-IV-TR;
American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and International Classiﬁcation
ofDiseases 10 (WorldHealthOrganization, 2008). Patientswith comorbid
Axis-I diagnoses were excluded from the study. Healthy subjects were
screened for Axis-I and Axis-II psychiatric disorders using the Mini-
International Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I, (Ackenheil et al.,
1999)) and excluded whenever signs of such a disorder were detected.The psychopathology of the patient group was assessed with the scales
for the assessment of positive and negative symptoms (SAPS
(Andreasen, 1984) and SANS (Andreasen, 1983), respectively) by two
experienced psychiatrists. Patientswere recruited from theDepartment
of Psychiatry, Charité - Universitätsmedizin Berlin. As a measure of
cognitive performance, the Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia
(BACS (Keefe et al., 2004)) was used. Sociodemographic data, drug
information as well as performance in BACS and SAPS and SANS are
depicted in Table 1. Drug doses are expressed as Chlorpromazine
equivalent (Woods, 2003; Andreasen et al., 2010). We obtained
written-informed consent from all participants before the start of
the experiment. The local Ethics committee of the Charité University
Hospital, Berlin, approved the study.
2.2. Experimental setup
We used a virtual reality (VR) environment, programmed in
presentation control language (version 0.71; Neurobehavioral
Systems, Inc., Albany, CA). The VR consisted of a photo-realistic
virtual representation of a desk; a touchpad device and a pen.
Participants sat in front of a computer screen displaying the VR.
The touchpad device, the pen as well as a computer keyboard
were placed below an extensible shelf to ensure that only the
virtual but not real movements were to be observed. The task was
to move the pen on the touchpad device in self-paced random
movements along four patches that were located at the surface of
the virtual touchpad device in a rectangular shape (see Fig. 1).
2.3. Experimental course
The experiment consisted of two conditions: the sense of agency task
as the experimental condition as well as a reaction time task as a control
condition. At the beginning of an experimental session, participantswere
familiarized with the setting (~4min). Subsequently, four experimental
blocks, each of them containing three sense of agency tasks and one
reaction time task, were performed.
2.3.1. Sense of agency task
The ongoingmovements of the virtual pen were controlled either by
the participant or the computer and continuously switched from one to
the other every 7 – 14s. Participantswere instructed to detect transitions
as fast as possible by releasing (loss of control) or pressing (regain of
control) the space bar of a computer keyboard. To provide a continuous
motor process and an adequate task difﬁculty, changes between both
periods were kept as smooth as possible. During periods with control
the motion of the real pen was continuously recorded and stored with
a sampling frequency of 60 Hz. As soon as the duration of controlled
motion was ≥7 s and the current motor vector was comparable to one
2 This was due to the different algorithms used for the two transition types. The
algorithm used for regain of control produced a much less smoother transition from the
periodwithout control to theperiodswith control. Thus, losses and regains of controlwere
not comparable events. That's why we decided to exclude the regain of control events
from analysis.
Fig. 1. Experimental setup.
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Euclidean distance within a tolerance of 2 millimetres, the control was
withdrawn by re-playing the stored pen movement regardless of the
participants' actual movements (Fig. 2A).
In order to ensure a smooth transition back to controlledmotion, the
distance between virtual and real pen was successively reduced within
the last second of the period without control (see Supplementary
Material Formula 1). Thus, the frequency of changes between periods
with and without control was about 9 s (average durations: periods
with control=9.04±1.16 s; periods without control=8.96±1.15 s).
If participants lifted the pen before they reached the end of the task,
the task was repeated.
2.3.2. Reaction time task
Patients were instructed to make self-paced random movements
along the four patches located on the touchpad's surface (see Fig. 1). A
coloured dot on the pen's tip changed its colour every 7 – 14 s from
red to green and backwards again. Participants were requested to
indicate this change by pressing or releasing the space bar.
2.4. Parameter extraction
Since we used a self-paced motion task, participants were likely to
differ in their general motor behaviour. This might cause interferences
between general motor and SoA speciﬁc effects. For example, changes
in control to a slow, temporally and spatially constant and smooth
motion trajectory are much harder to detect than those appearing in
temporally and spatially fast changing rough trajectories. We therefore
quantiﬁed individual motor parameters for each participant and used
selected parameters to address this issue in the sense of agency parameter
analysis.
2.4.1. Motor parameters
Based on the individual trajectories from the SoA task, we computed
themean trajectory velocity and the variability of the trajectory velocity
as a measure of motion stability (see Supplementary material Formula
2). To quantify the shape of the trajectory we computed the mean of
the absolute inverse curvatures for each waypoint (see Fig. 2 Panel B
and Supplementary material Formula 3). This value served as an
estimate for the mean radius of the drawn circles. Furthermore, we
assessed the smoothness of the trajectory by computing the ratio
between the path lengths of the original and the temporally low pass
ﬁltered trajectory (cut off frequency=10Hz).Finally, we divided the tablet in 42 × 30 grid squares with a side
length of 5 mm and computed the condition speciﬁc probability the
pen was within a certain square (see Supplementary material Formula
4). The resulting probability ﬁelds were averaged for both groups and
represent overall motion behaviour (Fig. 2 Panel C).
By means of these motor parameters, we tested differences in
general motor behaviour between groups and conditions in order to
control for confounding effects.2.4.2. Sense of agency parameters
Switches in SoA as indicated by participants agency judgements
were differentiated into those (i) related to actual losses of control2
and (ii) those occurring irrespectively of actual changes of control
(false negative agency judgements or false positive agency judgements).
For event class (i) we estimated the latency for each agency judgement
by subtracting the individual mean reaction time (as obtained from the
subsequent reaction time task) from these response times. Thus, task
unspeciﬁc differences in individual motor skills and also potential
vigilance induced drifts in response speed could be taken into account.
Secondly, for these trajectory points we computed the mean Euclidean
distances between real and virtual pen as well as the mean angular
disparities between the movement vectors (see Fig. 2 Panel A & B and
Supplementary material Formula 5). For event class (ii) we analysed
the mean number as well as the mean duration of false negative agency
judgements and false positive agency judgements per task block. To
minimize effects of learning, motivation and vigilance, the ﬁrst and the
last SoA block were excluded from analysis.2.5. Inference statistics
For motor parameters, 2-way Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) for
repeatedmeasures with the factors GROUP (Sz/HC) and CONDITION
(control/no control) were performed separately for the motion
velocity, the variability of trajectory velocity, the inverse curvature
of the trajectory, the trajectory smoothness, and each grid square of
the probability ﬁeld.
For SoA parameters, one-way Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVAs)
with the factor GROUP (Sz/HC) and the covariates variability of
trajectory,mean inverse trajectory curvature and trajectory smoothness
were performed for the estimated time point of switch of SoA (only
losses), the Euclidean distance between trajectories (real and virtual)
and the angular disparity between the movement vectors at this
time point as well as the absolute number of false negative agency
judgements, the absolute number of false positive agency judgements
and the mean durations participants remained in this states. Only
temporally and spatially variablemeasures were chosen for covariation,
because, due to the algorithm we used for this paradigm, these
parameters were the ones most likely to affect the results of the SoA
task. In contrast, temporally and spatially stable measures, such as the
mean velocity, should have no impact on the results.
Associations between SAPS, SANS and BACS sum scores and the
SoA parameters were assessed by partial correlation analysis with the
same covariates as described for the ANCOVAS. If one group showed
a signiﬁcant correlation, we tested for signiﬁcant between group
differences in correlation by estimating the 95% conﬁdence intervals
of correlation coefﬁcients of both groups by means of bootstrapping.
The signiﬁcance threshold was set to a value of p=.05, Bonferroni
corrected for multiple comparisons. Only results passing this threshold
were considered for discussion.
Fig. 2. Schematic depiction of selected SoA andmotor parameters. Panels A: Representativemotion trajectory for a loss of control. The trajectory of the real pen is displayed as solid blue
line. The trajectory of the virtual pen is displayed as dashed red line (upper two graphs). In the lower graph, the state of real control is displayed as solid and an exemplary SoA course is
displayed as dashed black line. Periods of false negative agency judgement (fp) and false positive agency judgement (fp) are highlighted. Panel B shows the same trajectory in plane. Please
note the smooth transition after the change in control as indicated by a triangle. The time point/position of participants' response is highlighted bya circle and the timepoint/position of the
estimated switch of judgement is indicated by a square. In panel B also the Euclidean distance (ED) and the angular disparity (AD) as well as the geometrical meaning of the inverse
trajectory curvature (radius rj of the best ﬁtting circle for trajectory point [xj,yj]) are shown. Panel C shows the mean normalized motion probability ﬁelds separated for group and
condition. The normalization was done bymeans of chance probability PChance. Thus, for a value of ﬁve, denote a probability of ﬁve times greater than chance. Beside themean probability
ﬁelds, the post-hoc t-test for the only signiﬁcant main effect of group is shown (Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons). Abbreviations: Sz – group of schizophrenic patients;
HC – healthy control group; r – release; p – press; y – yes; n – no.
36 J.-D. Werner et al. / Schizophrenia Research 152 (2014) 33–40All computations and statistical analyses were performed using
Matlab R2010b (Mathworks Inc, Natick, MA) and the Statistical Package
for Social Sciences (SPSS V20, IBM Corp., Armonk, NY).
3. Results
3.1. Motor parameters
Two way ANOVAs revealed only signiﬁcant main effects for the
factor group for all motor parameters: independent of the actual control
state, patients moved the pen signiﬁcantly slower (mean velocity:p b .001) but more temporally constant (SD velocity: p b .001) than
healthy subjects. Moreover, patients' trajectories were signiﬁcantly
narrower (mean inverse curvature: p b .001) and tended to be less
smooth (mean smoothness: p = .037, but not signiﬁcant in post-hoc
t-test). Patients showed also signiﬁcantly slower response speed
compared to healthy subjects (mean release time: p=.013).
The grid-wise analysis of motion probability ﬁelds showed only
signiﬁcant differences between the condition speciﬁc ﬁelds. No main
effect group or an interaction could be detected.
There was no signiﬁcant correlation between any of the motor
parameters and Chlorpromazine equivalents (see Tables 2 and 3).
Table 2
Motor and sense of agency parameters — descriptive statistics.
Sz HC
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Control No control n Control No control n
Motor parameters
Mean velocity (mms−1) 164 (46) 161 (50) 20 204 (44) 203 (48) 18
SD velocity (mms−1) 89 (25) 90 (24) 20 118 (40) 122 (32) 18
Inverse trajectory curvature (mm) 20 (11) 20 (11) 20 30 (12) 29 (11) 18
Trajectory smoothness .973 (.008) .969 (.010) 20 .976 (.003) .973 (.004) 18
Mean release time - RT task (ms) 692 (168) 20 581 (67) 18
SoA parameters
Estimated latency of switch (ms) 2254 (643) 20 1760 (412) 18
Euclidean distance at switch (mm) 44.5 (16.5) 20 47.0 (14.2) 18
Angular disparity at switch (°) 65.4 (22.8) 20 66.1 (14.4) 18
# of false negative agency judgements 1.55 (1.57) – 20 .89 (.83) – 18
# of false positive agency judgements – 16.2 (10.6) 20 – 12.6 (8.8) 18
Duration of false negative agency judgements (ms) 4405 (4637) – 15 1676 (2272) – 12
Duration of false positive agency judgements (ms) – 7651 (8075) 20 3275 (1977) 18
Abbreviations: Sz – group of schizophrenic patients; HC – healthy control group; SD – standard deviation,; RT – reaction time; SoA – Sense of Agency
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3.2.1. Group differences
Separate one-way ANCOVAS revealed a signiﬁcant group difference
for the mean duration of false negative agency judgements . Post-hoc
t-test showed a strong tendency (see Tables 2 and 3, Fig. 3).
3.2.2. Correlations with psychopathology and cognitive performance
There were no signiﬁcant correlations between the sum scores as
taken from SAPS and SANS and the SoA parameters within the Sz group.
The BACS sum score was signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with the
number of false negative agency judgements and the number as well as
the mean duration of false positive agency judgements in schizophrenic
patients but not in healthy subjects. In healthy subjects only the mean
Euclidean distance at the estimated time point of each agency judgement
was correlated with the BACS sum score. Subsequent bootstrapping
revealed a distinct 95% conﬁdence interval for the correlation between
BACS and the number of false negative agency judgements. No distinctTable 3
Motor and sense of agency parameters – inference statistics. SoA statistics adjusted for mot
F
Motor parameters (ANOVA)
Mean velocity (mms–1) 14.24
SD velocity (mms–1) 18.28
Inverse trajectory curvature (mm) 13.23
Trajectory smoothness 4.51
Mean release time – RT task (ms) 6.84
SoA parameters (ANCOVA)
Estimated latency of switch (ms) 3.12
Euclidean distance at switch (mm) 0.16
Angular disparity at switch (°) 0.09
# of false negative agency judgements 2.47
# of false positive agency judgements 0.43
Duration of false negative agency judgements (ms) 4.4
Duration of false positive agency judgements (ms) 1.52
Abbreviations: SD – standard deviation,; RT – reaction time; SoA – Sense of Agency.95% conﬁdence interval was found for the other group speciﬁc
correlation coefﬁcients (Table 4).4. Discussion
We investigated factors contributing to agency judgements in
schizophrenic patients and a group of healthy subjects using a novel
visuomotor task. By forcing participants into continuous monitoring of
their actions and explicit agency judgements, we created a situation of
constant uncertainty with respect to the match between participants'
actions and the visual feedback.
Importantly, the experimental design allowed us to distinguish two
kinds of erroneous agency attributions and observe potential inﬂuences
of cognitive factors or psychopathological traits on such attribution
errors: (1) Erroneous self-attribution despite an actual mismatch of
visual feedback and actual hand movements (false positive agency
judgement) and (2) erroneous external attribution despite an actualor parameters. Signiﬁcant differences are highlighted with gray.
ME group ME condition Interaction
p T p F p F p
<.001 –2.70 .010 .04 .841 0 .947
<.001 –3.09 .004 .16 .691 .07 .792
<.001 –2.50 .014 .01 .912 .03 .872
.037 –1.90 .065 3.86 .053† .02 .892
.013 –2.61 .013
.087† – –
.689 – –
.77 – –
.126 – –
.515 – –
.048 2.13 .043
.226 – –
Fig. 3. Results of SoA parameter analysis. Signiﬁcant group differences (Panel A), partial correlations between SoA parameters and BACS sum score and probability density functions of
correlation coefﬁcients (Panels B & C) as obtained frombootstrap analyses (999 bootstrap operations per group and parameter). The 95% CI for the bootstrapped correlation coefﬁcients are
overlaid on the density plots. All SoA parameters were adjusted for motor parameters (mean variability in trajectory velocity, mean inverse trajectory curvature and mean trajectory
smoothness).
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agency judgement).
Interestingly, patients and healthy subjects differed only in one of
these possible misattribution errors: The duration of false negative
agency judgements was signiﬁcantly prolonged in patients suffering
from schizophrenia (while the number of such false negative agency
judgements did not differ between groups). For false positive agency
judgements, we found no difference between groups. This result
differs from a number of previous studies which mostly found that
schizophrenic patients are generally more prone to attribute agency to
themselves in a highly ambiguous environment (Daprati et al., 1997;
Fourneret et al., 2002; Knoblich et al., 2004; Hauser et al., 2011). In
their review of 2011, Moore and Fletcher suggested that there might
be a general tendency to attribute agency to oneself under conditions
of uncertainty (Moore and Fletcher, 2011). Recently, Ferri et al.
(2012) found that ﬁrst-episode schizophrenia patients showed a higherTable 4
Partial correlation between BACS sum score and Sense of Agency parameters Signiﬁcant di
S
r (11)
BACS
Estimated latency of switch (ms) –0.329
Euclidean distance at switch (mm) 0.187
Angular disparity at switch (°) 0.29
# of false negative agency judgements –0.65
# of false positive agency judgements –0.536
Duration of false negative agency judgements (ms) –0.443
Duration of false positive agency judgements (ms) –0.574
Abbreviations: Sz – group of schizophrenic patients; HC – healthy control group; BACS – Brief
bootstrapping.number of self-misattribution errors, possibly due to having access to
less discriminative information for self-recognition than healthy
subjects.
Despite such evidence from previous studies, the result of our study
may not be as surprising as it seems at the ﬁrst glance: Erroneous
external agency attributions in our setup occurred during phases in
which the discrepancies between motor signals and sensory feedback
actually did not differ. False negative agency judgementsmust have been
caused by transient, spontaneous errors in sensorimotor integration,
which then led to a false agency attribution. Such errors did not occur
signiﬁcantly more often in patients compared to healthy subjects, but
patients did not correct them as quickly as healthy subjects and stayed
longer in the false belief that they were not in control of the pen.
On the contrary, in the case of false positive agency judgements, a
judgement error occurred despite a large mismatch between internal
motor signals and visual feedback. Such large discrepancies betweenfferences are highlighted with gray.
z HC 95% CI(Sz) boot 95% CI(HC) boot
p r (11) p lower upper lower upper
0.231 0.39 0.151 – – – –
0.505 0.548 0.034 –0.304 0.594 –0.041 0.860
0.295 0.18 0.522 – – – –
0.009 0.178 0.526 –0.932 –0.471 –0.376 0.681
0.039 –0.182 0.517 –0.788 0.088 –0.614 0.451
0.173 –0.151 0.698 – – – –
0.025 –0.09 0.743 –0.896 –0.098 –0.512 0.541
Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia; CI – conﬁdence interval; boot – as revealed by
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for both patients and healthy subjects alike— there were no signiﬁcant
differences in number or duration of false positive agency judgements.
These results support the theory, that patients suffering from
schizophrenia rely less on (possibly imprecise) internal sensorimotor
predictions and use external sensory (i.e. visual) feedback more
strongly to make judgements about agency (Synofzik et al., 2010; Voss
et al., 2010, for a review see Synofzik et al., 2013): While there seems
to be no difﬁculty to detect large discrepancies between action and
visual feedback, transient disruptions in sensorimotor integration led
to signiﬁcantly longer durations of false negative agency judgements.
Furthermore, the situation of false negative agency judgements resembles
somewhat a symptom commonly observed in patients suffering from
schizophrenia: delusions of alien control, in which own movements
do not feel self-generated anymore. In contrast to patients, where
internal signals predicting agency are corrupted by noise (Moore and
Haggard, 2008; Voss et al., 2010), the sensorimotor system in healthy
subjects seems capable of compensating such errors more rapidly
(Malenka et al., 1982; Frith and Done, 1989; Stirling et al., 1998).
Another core ﬁnding in our study is a correlation between cognitive
measures as reﬂected in the BACS sum score with performance in the
sensorimotor task. The number of false negative agency judgements as
well as the number and the duration of false positive agency judgements
were negatively correlated with the performance in cognitive tests
(BACS) in the patient group only. In other words — less cognitive
impairment led to a lower number of agency misattributions.
This strongly suggests an inﬂuence of top down processes on the
sensorimotor level integrating additional cues or strategies to
evaluate the current state of SoA. Such additional cognitive cues could
be used to “override” transient (and potentially noisy) integrations
from the sensorimotor system alone and therefore make the agency
judgements more reliable. The fact that subsequent bootstrapping
showed a signiﬁcant difference of the 95% conﬁdence intervals only
for the correlation between BACS and the number of false negative
agency judgements might suggest a disease independent general effect
of cognitive functioning on SoA, albeit less pronounced and not
signiﬁcant in healthy subjects. Only in schizophrenic patients
compensatory effects driven by cognitive performance seem to become
relevant.
Another ﬁnding that stresses the potential inﬂuence of cognitive
functioning on agency judgements is the positive correlation between
BACS sum score and the mean Euclidean distance at the estimated
time point of switch of SoA. This ﬁnding may suggest that higher
cognitive functioning leads to an adjustment of the criterion (Euclidean
distance) to make a judgement of agency in a situation of uncertainty.
To our knowledge, no study before reported associations between
behavioural measures related to the SoA and cognitive performance in
a group of schizophrenic patients. Our ﬁndings support the hypothesis
that the alterations seen in the patient group are the result of an
impaired and more rigid integration mechanism, which is more error-
prone due to the strong reliance on external rather than internal cues.
Patients with greater cognitive resources may be able to better
compensate for deﬁcits in this process in highly ambiguous situations.
In contrast to previous studies (Daprati et al., 1997; Franck et al., 2001;
Fourneret et al., 2002; Schnell et al., 2008; Voss et al., 2010) we did
not ﬁnd a correlation between behavioural measures (SoA parameters)
in our task and psychopathology of the patients collective. This could
be partially explained by the fact that, due to the complexity of our
task, we could only include highly functional patients. Furthermore,
Delevoye-Turrell et al. (2002) showed that performance on a basic
sensorimotor level does not differ between delusional and not delusional
patients. The authors suggest that the problem of imprecise predictions
about the sensory consequences of one's own actions rather lies on a
higher cognitive level.
Differences in motor behaviour between patients and healthy
subjects are in line with previous reports showing impoverishedmotor behaviour in schizophrenia (e.g. Cadenhead et al., 1997;
Jogems-Kosterman et al., 2001). In line with Schwartz et al. (1989,
1991) we found also a decrease in reaction speed. Together, this could
lead to artiﬁcial ﬁndings (e.g. a SoA independent prolongation of
response times). Keeping this in mind, we adjusted all SoA parameters
for variability in trajectory velocity, trajectory curvature and trajectory
smoothness.
In summary, our data suggest that patients with schizophrenia
exhibit a less ﬂexible and more rigid judgment of agency. Higher
overall cognitive functioning might alleviate this impairment. We
argue that sensorimotor integration is a constantly ongoing process
with frequently updated judgements that are highly inﬂuenced by
cognitive control. Our results strengthen the role of such cognitive
elements and might help deepening the understanding of self-
attribution bias in patients with schizophrenia.
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